Written in 1947 during debate over Article 218 of the German penal code on abortion, Romano Guardini's brief essay strikes with its clarity and, above all, its foresight. With unusual restraint for a work on such contested ground—and without once invoking religious argument—the philosopher takes on questions that seem, to us, to have emerged only from recent advances in assisted reproduction: the use of embryos, for instance.
His central claim: a profound contradiction exists between the modern view of man as "sole master and agent of his own existence" and "the once-vivid sense of the fundamental inviolability of human life." The widespread temptation is to treat abortion, embryo selection, and their use for research as purely private choices.
The philosopher's warning is unambiguous: "Once we begin to accept harm as sufficient reason to violate human life, we cannot hold any limit firmly in place."
To deny the embryo the status of human being from its first moment of development, for example, opens the door to a hierarchy of value—not only in the embryonic stage, but across all phases of life. If we can distinguish lesser and greater worth before birth, the same logic applies after. The more sick, weak, or unfortunate a person becomes, the less claim they can make to the status of a human being—since disability, illness, physical and mental decline all represent deviations from the optimum: the person born whole, healthy, and strong.
Giulia Galeotti, 2005